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DISCUSSION.

DOES POLITICAL COMPULSION NEED TO BE JUSTIFIED?

DR. WILLOUGHBY thinks (JOURNAL, July, 1899, p. 473) that a moral justification of the State is not needed, because "the compulsion exercised by the State does not differ *in kind* from that which would exist without a State, and that therefore there is no *a priori* ground for demanding its ethical *quo warranto*,—no presumption against its moral right to be." But may not the rightfulness of the compulsion that arises in extra-political conditions be challenged? If so, how does it help to assimilate political compulsion to it? It still seems to me that force of whatever kind (when exercised not by nature, but by an intelligent being or beings) requires some sort of explanatory justification. Force means putting some one else's will in place of my own in determining my action. Surely, from the stand-point of personality, this gives rise to a problem.

I admit that Dr. Willoughby has, in a sense, put me in the wrong in saying that the State "limits freedom,"—*i.e.*, using this expression with the utmost strictness. The individual is not literally compelled to pay his taxes. He is simply liable to suffer heavily if he does not. He is not forced to go to war when drafted; he is only put in prison, if he refuses. Undoubtedly, the moral personality, in its most intimate sense, does survive any sort of external attack. One can even choose to be hanged rather than do what the State wants him to do. And yet I think that enforcing demands by penalties such as these would, colloquially, be spoken of as limiting freedom quite decidedly. It does not destroy "velleity," but it does make the choice of alternatives rather meagre. If I give up my purse to some one who points a pistol at me, saying, "Your money or your life," I still keep my essential freedom, and yet I should not be going far astray if I also said that I was forced to act as I did. Indeed, I should hardly be doing violence to language if I remarked that under such circumstances I was not free to *choose* what I would do. I had to do it, I should naturally say,—or else lose my life. Ordinary speech refuses to call acts done under such pressure of fear voluntary,—though, of course, in the last analysis they are so. Now, it was in this same looser sense that I said the individual *has* to pay his taxes. Indeed, the sort of necessity I had in mind was presumably none other than Dr. Willoughby has in

mind when he contrasts "legal compulsion" with "voluntary action," or says, "where men obey from necessity the ethical duty is soon forgotten." Would not Dr. Willoughby give as instances of possible "legal compulsion" or obedience "from necessity," the payment of taxes or enforced military service? Well, in whatever sense compulsion may be real in these cases (and I am aware that it cannot be in all senses), in whatever sense man is made to obey instead of obeying voluntarily, to this extent the problem I raised seems to me a real one,—freedom of choice as well as of action being correspondingly limited. Why should such compulsion exist? Why should not moral means be used exclusively for social ends,—I mean, appeals to reason and conscience, and, in general, education? This is the fundamental political problem, and it is hardly faced by saying that force will be used anyway.

In stating the problem as I do, I by no means wish to imply that a justification of the force used by the State may not be given, or that Dr. Willoughby, in his ably-written book, has not himself given it, or at least pointed the way to it (see pp. 118, 119 of my review, *JOURNAL*, October, 1896).

WILLIAM M. SALTER.

CHICAGO.

BOOK REVIEWS.

LECTURES AND ESSAYS ON NATURAL THEOLOGY AND ETHICS. By William Wallace, late Fellow of Merton College, and Whyte's Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Oxford. Edited, with a Biographical Introduction, by Edward Caird, Master of Balliol College, Oxford. Clarendon Press, 1898. Pp. xl., 566.

This book falls into four divisions, the first of which is the Biographical Introduction by the Master of Balliol. In the other three we have (1) the lectures which have been preserved of the two courses of Gifford Lectures delivered by Professor Wallace in the University of Glasgow in 1894 and 1895. (2) Nine essays in Moral Philosophy, including such heads as "Person and Personality," "Duty," "Hedonism," "Utilitarianism," and (3) Four critical essays on Lotze, Nietzsche, and Mr. McTaggart's "Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic." One of the essays on Nietzsche ap-